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Abstract  
The paper proposes a critical interpretation of the development of new institutional economics and of its 
relationship with other economic fields. Consistently with the oil-spot dynamics model, new 
institutionalism can be described as an enlargement of the mainstream that, in time, seems to further 
expand towards heterodoxy by branching and specializing. Institutional cognitive economics positions itself at 
the borders between these two areas. With its focus on the cognitive processes underlying institutional 
genesis and evolution, it is the result of the integration process between the ideas of new (D.C. North’s 
in particular) and old institutionalism (T. Veblen’s in particular) plus the injection of F. Hayek’s theories 
on the link between mind and institutions. Institutional cognitive economics also represents an example of 
interdisciplinary cross-fertilization that is taking place at the border of social sciences and that might 
represent the future of our discipline. 
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“Shifting boundaries in Economics: the Institutional Cognitive strand” 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Economic theory is an important area in the universe of social sciences. Far from being a coherent 
endeavor, economics can be seen as a domain composed by various theoretical blocks that develop, 
expand, and recombine. Recombination takes places both within the field and at its boundaries with a 
growing openness towards other disciplines. This process results in boundaries that are changeable and 
fuzzy: there are porous zones characterized by non-trivial dynamics within and across blocks.  
Economics is often assigned a special role within social science. As compared with say, sociology, 
economics is much more attached to the idea of being a monolithic field. In line with the sociology of 
scientific knowledge, Davis (2008) explains this distinctive trait with the necessity of defending the 
autonomy of the discipline both from neighboring endeavors and from the hard sciences. The idea of 
having a strong consensus within the discipline would be functional to the defense of the domain from 
other similar communities of scholars that might invade those research areas that economics has 
identified as its domain. Moreover, the distinction between orthodoxy – with the attached meaning of 
best scientific approach – and heterodoxy – with the attached meaning of unscientific – allows 
economics to be seen from the outside as a somehow reliable and cohesive discipline in the ambit of 
policy. For what concerns the hard sciences, the divide serves the purpose of hiding the fact that 
economics has a plurality of views and values inspiring research and therefore that it is not as ‘pure’ as, 
say, physics. Hiding or minimizing value judgments that lay behind research in a domain with a strong 
empirical vocation is fundamental.  As (the dismissal as unscientific of) a heterodoxy is needed to 
strengthen the “scientific” character of economics (and its orthodoxy) itself, pluralism would make 
value judgment simply too apparent, and thereby disrupt the image of economics as a science (Cedrini 
and Fontana p. 9, 2015). 
In this scenario, new institutional economics (hereafter, NIE) represents a particularly interesting 
area. On the one side, it constitutes the most important contemporary research field dealing with 
institutions; one the other side, its recent developments reveal the distinctive aspects of the trend that 
seems to characterize current economics. 
Embracing the literature that represents NIE as an enlargement of mainstream, the paper 
highlights the common features and the main differences with respect to mainstream and orthodox1, 
                                                          
1 Mainstream and orthodox are respectively defined as: “the ideas that are held by those individuals 
who are dominant in the leading academic institutions, organizations, and journals at any given time 
(Colander, Holt and Rosser 2004, 490) and “the most recently dominant ‘school of thought’, which has 
been long recognized as being ‘neoclassical economics’” (Colander, Holt and Rosser 2004, ibidem). 
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theory and the relationship with old-original2 institutionalism3. The interplay among them allows 
identifying boundaries’ and shifting processes among these economic areas.  
The analysis relies on the oil-spot dynamics model (Fontana, 2010) that describes economics as a 
complex and evolving system characterized by expanding forces. From this angle, new institutional 
economics is as a widening area pivoting on the fundamental assumptions of mainstream and 
absorbing, by means of appropriate re-arrangements, the institutional level of economic analysis. It 
follows that the paper provides evidence for the noteworthy program4 of rejoining old institutionalism 
and evolutionary economics, under the auspices of a constructive dialogue with new institutional 
economics.  
The relationship between the various instances of institutionalism and the mainstream are further 
complicated by a surge of interdisciplinarity that lately has profoundly affected the traits of economics. 
Institutional cognitive economics, a recent research stream that originates from the integration of new 
institutional economics, old institutionalism and the Hayekian contributions to the theory of knowledge 
production, is a paradigmatic example of a novel attitude that characterizes the discipline. The 
disenchantment with the superpowers of mathematical modeling and the mounting dissatisfaction with 
the standard behavioral assumption has spurred economists to seek more reliable methods and more 
sound theoretical underpinnings even beyond its traditional boundaries. In this perspective, 
Institutional cognitive economics deepens the fruitful merge between economics and cognitive sciences 
inaugurated by cognitive economics. By building on the findings of cognitive economics, institutional 
cognitive economics gives special emphasis to psychology and to neurosciences. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 adopts the oil-spot dynamics model in order to compare 
new institutional economics to mainstream and orthodox economics; Section 3 extends the comparison 
to old original institutional economics; section 4 describes and then places institutional cognitive 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
2 In the paper “old institutionalism” or “old institutional economics” indicate contributions of the main 
representative authors of first institutional theory (end of the 19th century – first half of the 20th century, 
see par. 3.2. “Original institutionalism” or “original institutional economics” refer to the literature 
recovering the tradition of old institutionalism. The expression “old-original institutional economics”, 
finally encloses the previous ones. 
 
3 New Institutionalism exponents are North (1990, 1994, 2005), Stanfield (1999), Hodgson (2014) and 
Stoelhorst (2014). 
 
4
 Such program has been defined in detail in a special issue of the Journal of Institutional Economics, in 
2014: Hodgson, 2014; Hodgson and Stoelhorst, 2014; Ménard, 2014; Ménard and Shirley, 2014; 
Stoelhorst, 2014; Winter, 2014; Witt, 2014). “…NIE can learn from the original institutionalism, 
particularly when elaborating more dynamic analyses, and developing more nuances, psychologically 
grounded and empirically viable theories of human motivation.” (Hodgson, 2014, p. 591). 
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economics in the scenario of contemporary economics; Section 5 concludes and suggests further 
research questions. 
 
2.  The oil-spot dynamics model  
 
The oil-spot dynamics model (Fontana, 2010) analyzes the core features and evolving forces that 
characterize mainstream, orthodox and heterodox economics (see Colander et al., 2004; Dequech, 
2007; Davis, 2008; Cedrini and Fontana, 2015). 
 
The oil-spot dynamics model – figure 1 - considers mainstream, as absorbing revolutionary ideas 
and criticisms in ways that tend to reconcile them with the orthodoxy thereby guaranteeing its survival. 
Overall, the process results in a progressive enlargement of mainstream’s boundaries.  
As hinted above, mainstream is a sociological category, in the sense that it is defined by those ideas, 
objectives and methods proposed and shared by individuals who hold a leading and prestigious role 
within the academy. On the other hand, orthodoxy and heterodoxy are intellectual categories: the 
former broadly correspond to the Samuelsonian/Neoclassical approach while the latter, is defined by 
the rejection of the orthodox pillars.5 Mainstream and orthodox economics does not overlap since 
orthodoxy relies on the notion of equilibrium and on the rationality postulate while mainstream results 
in broader and eclectic area where criticism have been bolted on (e.g. bounded rationality, imperfect 
information etc.). 
Mainstream has absorbed those ideas that are recognized as valid and has incorporated them in a  
 compatible way. Among such new elements there are the imperfections introduced in rationality 
and information.  
Fontana stresses the role of the narrative dimension in contributing to the definition of boundaries 
among economic areas. Such dimension reflects orientation of authors towards the different 
approaches, often irrespective of the actual content of their contributions, but according to their 
choices of stressing less or more the innovative or mainstream elements inside and, consequently, to 
their choices of being published by specific journals. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Definition of mainstream, orthodox and heterodox categories’ boundaries and shifting processes is 
controversial and deeply discussed (Blaug, 2003; Colander et al., 2004; Blume and Durlauf, 2006; Davis, 
2008; Fontana, 2010). 
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Figure 1 - Fontana’s oil-spot dynamics model 
 
 
 
 
3. The oil-spot dynamics  
 
New institutional economics reinvigorates the tradition of old institutionalism by putting 
institutions at the core of economic analysis. However, as the literature points out, while “resurrecting” 
the institutional tradition, Nie also changes it by shifting it towards the orbit of mainstream neoclassical 
economics (Stanfield, 1999; Hodgson, 2000; Rutherford, 2001).6 
 
3.1 New institutional economics as an enlargement of mainstream theory 
 
In the definition offered by Klein (1998, p. 1),  “The New Institutional Economics (NIE) is an 
interdisciplinary enterprise combining economics, law, organization theory, political science, sociology, 
and anthropology to understand the institutions of social, political and commercial life. It borrows 
liberally from various social-sciences disciplines, but its primary language is economics. Its goal is to 
                                                          
6 The debate on the relationship between old and new institutional economics has particularly 
characterized the period between the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21th one (Klein, 
1998; Rutherford, 2001; Hodgson, 2000; 2004). 
Narrative 
Mainstream 
Orthodoxy 
Heterodoxy 
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explain what institutions are, how they arise, what purposes they serve, how they change, and how – if 
at all – they should be reformed.” 
           New institutional economics consolidated in the second half of the 20th century thanks to the 
seminal works of R. Coase, O. Williamson and D.C. North’s on governance structures and transaction 
costs. Generally, NIE pivots on three elements: institutions, governance structures and individuals 
(Williamson, 1985; 1986; 1996a; 1998a; 1999; North, 1990; 1991) whose interaction determines the 
development and performance of the economies. Individuals represent the link between institutions 
and governance structures. By devising institutions and organizational forms individuals reduce 
uncertainty and face the problem of scarce information. Namely governance systems should guarantee 
transactions from against bounded rationality, opportunism and asset specificity.7  
Currently, NIE is characterized by different strands that focus of different aspects (Klein, 1998; 
Rutherford, 2001; Hodgson, 2004; Ménard and Shirley, 2008; Eggertsson, 2013).  Such strands cover 
both the micro-dimension of institutional analysis, concerning governance structures the macro-
dimension, i.e. the institutional environment, which includes the set of all formal and informal rules.  
The micro-dimension of institutional analysis includes those streams concerning theories of firm 
and dealing with a series of organizations and tools that regulate exchanges (e.g. firms, public 
bureaucracies, non-profit organizations, long-term contracts and other contractual agreements). Related 
approaches are: moral-hazard agency; transaction costs economics (including vertical integration; 
informal agreements; franchise contracting); capabilities and competences of the firm. 
The macro-dimension of institutional analysis includes those strands dealing with: legal 
environment and property rights; norms and social conventions; economic history and economic 
growth; positive political theory.  
In order to locate NIE in the tripartite classification shown in figure 1., Table 1 identifies six 
criteria according to which explore the compatibility of NIE and mainstream economics: economic 
problem; individual; context; institutions; approach; method
8
. Rectangular boxes highlight the compatible 
elements of new institutional economics and mainstream economics while the circular box detects the 
analytical focus that differentiate the two fields (Klein, 1998; Rutherford, 2001; Hodgson, 2000; 2004).  
In more details, in NIE the economic problem remains the optimal allocation of scarce resources in 
accordance with preference and under a budget constraint.  The criticisms to the concept of Olympian 
rationality however, have been met by the acceptance of the Simonian concept of bounded rationality 
                                                          
7 Without these three assumptions, transaction processes would be drastically simplified and 
governance would not be necessary. Particularly, its efficiency would be guaranteed by only planning (if 
bounded rationality was missing); or by promises (if opportunism was missing); or, finally, by 
competition (if asset specificity was missing). 
8 The same features are also scrutinized for orthodox, mainstream economics and old-original 
institutionalism. See Table 1 and section 3.2. 
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(Pagano 1999). The acceptance of bounded rationality however posed a serious challenge to the 
functioning of the oil spot dynamics – i.e. the inclusion of “dissenting opinions” in the mainstream. While 
it is commonly recognized that  “bounded rationality is not just some other kind of utility maximization 
or something close to it” (Dequech 2001, 917; North 1990, 19)9, NIE successfully attempted at 
recasting it in optimizing terms in order to preserve the core of the orthodoxy/mainstream: general 
equilibrium framework.  
One of the elements that considerably takes distance from orthodoxy is the context. The static context 
of orthodox theory - characterized by perfect information, certainty and the absence of historical time – 
is left behind in favor of imperfect information and the relevance of historical time, especially path-
dependence.  
 
The methodological vocation covers various ranges of individualism with different degree of 
reductionism10 assuring fully compatibility with the maximization of utility11.  
 
Finally, while prima facie Nie seems to be more open to apply a comparative institutional analysis - 
which, far from measuring real outcomes with the potential ones as one would expect from general 
equilibrium model, takes into account the alternative actual arrangements – the prevailing method is 
still reductionist and deductive. Formalism (quantitative methods, econometric analyses) - though lesser 
than in orthodoxy and mainstream economics - is accurately preserved (Groenewegen et al., 1995; 
Klein, 1998; Palermo, 1999; Stanfield, 1999; Rutherford, 2001). 
 
                                                          
9 “Instead of assuming a fixed set of alternatives among which the decision-maker chooses, we may 
postulate a process for generating alternatives. Instead of assuming known probability distributions of 
outcomes, we may introduce procedures for estimating them, or we may look for strategies for dealing 
with uncertainty that do not assume knowledge of probabilities. Instead of assuming the maximization 
of a utility function, we may postulate a satisficing strategy.” (Dequech 2001,ibidem) Contra see 
(Langlois, 1986; Rizzello, 1999). According to this view Bounded rationality - though defining the 
cognitive limits in decision-making process - is still characterized by some important features of 
substantive rationality - constrains (alternatives) and objectives (profit and utility function) - such that it 
is still possible to adopt a maximizing behavior, within those limits.  
 
10 Harsanyi (1968), p.321, argues that social norms should not be used as basic explanatory variables but 
rather should be themselves explained in terms of people’s individual objective and interests.  
 
11 The reductionist method is refused by other exponents of New Institutionalism like Basu (1998) and 
Langlois (1986). 
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Not surprisingly, the introduction of institutions in the analysis represents the actual element of 
difference between mainstream and new institutional economics.  However, the way institutions are 
dealt with in NIE is consistent with the mainstream approach. According to the oil-spot dynamics, Nie has 
formally accepted but substantially tamed the “heterodox” concepts that were more challenging for the 
status quo. This strategy has a double effect: it neutralizes the criticisms by leaving the theoretical pillars 
almost intact and, unintendedly, produces an enlargement of the boundaries of the mainstream. In the 
case of new institutionalism it also revives the old institutional tradition. 
 
3.2 Institutions in Nie: the incompatibility with old-original institutional economics  
 
Old institutionalism or institutional economics12 started to develop between the end of the 19th 
century and the first half of the 20th century mainly through the contributions of J.R. Commons, T. 
Veblen, W.C. Mitchell and C. Ayres. Its birth seems particularly tied to the necessity of an economic 
analysis taking into account the relevance of non-economic factors, considering the importance of 
political and social influences in economy after the World Wars13.  
 
In the aftermath of WWII, old institutionalism offered several seminal contributions analyzing 
institutional structures in an empirical and inductive way. Its relative success debouched into the 
famous competition with neoclassical economics, that as well know, was lost to the defenders of an 
evolutionary and broad tent approach to economic phenomena.  
Its decline was accelerated in the second half of the 20th century, by the rise of new institutional 
economics (Parada, 2001; Hodgson, 2009, 2014).14 Yet, old institutional economics did not vanish, 
rather it became the blueprint from which “original institutional economics” originated. 
 
As shown in table 1, the differences between new institutional economics and old-original 
institutional economics are definitely stark. The most relevant aspect of old-original institutionalism is 
                                                          
12 The term was introduced by W. Hamilton in 1918, during a meeting of the American Economic 
Association, with the paper “The Institutional Approach to Economic theory” (Hodgson, 2000; 
Rutherford, 2001; Ambrosino, 2012).  
 
13
 In this sense, the empirical and inductive method13 was the most appropriate for application (Klein, 
1990; Alston and Vaughan, 1993; Klein, 1998; Rutherford, 2001; Volchik, 2011).  
 
14 Parada (2001) summarized the factors of the decline: the high formalism which prevailed in economic 
theory at that time and which makes Nie more favored as well as the more conservative political 
approach which influenced economic theory; finally, the sterility of the current original institutionalism 
which did not add significant economic reflections to the first relevant contributions of the founders.  
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the centrality of evolution in the social and economic system15 (Groenewegen et al., 1995; Stanfield, 
1999; Hodgson, 2009).  
Individual - far from being the “lighting calculator” of orthodox theory - is strongly tied to the 
context and to the institutions of the society he/her is living in. Adopting Hodgson’s definition (2000), 
individual is “institutionalized”. Hodgson (2009) underlines the relevant role of “shared conventions, 
rules, routines and norms” in processing information: this is the process of enculturation which makes it 
possible to filter external stimuli and which is at the basis of individual rationality in old-original 
institutional economics. 
 
Old-original institutional economics stresses the interdependence between individuals and 
institutions. There is an upward and downward causal link: individuals create and change institutions; 
institutions mold and constrain individuals, conditioning their ideas and choices (Hodgson, 2000; 2009; 
Ambrosino, 2012).  
Such considerations make institutions - paradoxically - the most important element of contrast 
between old-original and new institutional economics. While new institutional economics considers 
institutions as devices that individuals use in order to simplify the environment, in Old-original 
institutional economics institutions are more than mere tools (Hayek, 1952; 1998a; 1998b). They are 
“habits of thought”, reflecting “generally accepted ways of thinking and behaving” (Rutherford, 2001).  
Moreover, new institutional economics concentrates on defining the institutes as restrictions while 
in old institutional economics focuses on institutes as “factors of agents informative ability” (Volchik, 
2011, p. 25). 
Old institutionalism – and, most of all, Veblen – takes into account the link between mind 
mechanisms and the genesis and evolution of institutional norms. In addition, Commons defines them 
as the reflection of individual action power that is strongly influenced by cultural and cognitive and that 
in time reveals the cumulative and path-dependent character typical of evolutionary processes (Volchik, 
2011; Ambrosino, 2012). 
Such concept of institutions reverberates in methods. Original institutional economics refuses the 
deductive and highly formal approach of orthodox and mainstream economics and adopts an empirical 
inductive comparative method. The latter consists in the collection of information and in the 
description of field studies, interpreted through pattern modeling techniques that are “an effort to bring 
into focus relationships or connections that are not evident in the conventional comprehension of the 
lived-world.” (Stanfield, 1999, pp. 236-7). This implies the multidisciplinary characteristic of original 
institutionalism (Groenewegen et al., 1995; Klein, 1998; Stanfield, 1999; Rutherford, 2001). 
                                                          
15 D.C. North constitutes an important exception to this general statement. We will return on the topic 
in section 4.1. 
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The approach is holistic (Groenewegen et al, 1995; Fontana, 1998; Klein, 1998). “In NIE analysis, 
institutions are derived from individual behavior through interaction among individuals. …OIE always 
underlines the role that habits, norms and institutions play in directing human behavior, without 
discarding some rationality in individual behavior but constrained by the social and economic 
environment.” (Parada, 2002, p. 3). 
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Table 1 – Focuses of analyses of the main economic fields 
 
                    AREAS 
 
 
FOCUS OF  
ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
ORTHODOX 
ECONOMICS 
 
 
MAINSTREAM 
ECONOMICS 
 
NEW  
INSTITUTIO 
NAL  
ECONOMICS 
 
OLD- 
ORIGINAL 
INSTITUTIONAL  
ECONOMICS 
ECONOMIC 
PROBLEM 
optimal allocation 
of scarce and 
given resources 
with defined 
budget 
constraints;  
 
  
optimal allocation 
of scarce and given 
resources with 
defined budget 
constraints; 
optimal allocation of 
scarce and given 
resources with defined 
budget constraints; 
 
continuous and 
evolutionary social, 
institutional and 
technological 
process modifying 
preferences and 
resources in time 
(endogenous 
character of 
economic facts); 
 
INDIVIDUAL well-defined 
preferences; 
Olympian 
rationality; 
opportunist 
behavior; 
well-defined 
preferences: 
bounded but not 
procedural 
rationality; 
opportunistic 
behavior; 
 
preferences formation 
process is recognized 
as endogenous, but it is 
not included in the 
analysis; 
bounded rationality; 
opportunist behavior; 
 
“institutionalized 
individuals” with 
heterogeneous 
variable preferences 
and choices 
conditioned on the 
social and historical 
evolutionary 
process;  
bounded rationality; 
 
CONTEXT static context; 
perfect 
information; 
no historical time; 
certainty; 
 
imperfections on 
information; 
uncertainty; 
introduction of 
historical time 
imperfections on 
information; 
uncertainty; 
introduction of 
historical time 
dynamic, 
interdependent and 
uncertain context; 
historical time; 
 
INSTITUTIONS absent: Paretian 
efficiency explains 
allocation 
dynamics; 
 
 
absent: Paretian 
efficiency explains 
allocation 
dynamics; 
 
 
institutions and 
governance structures 
are 
devices for reducing 
transactions costs; 
efficiency rationale; 
they are mere variables; 
 
institutions as 
“habits of thought” 
and not mere 
devices: reciprocal 
causation bond with 
individuals;  
cultural and 
historical evolution; 
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APPROACH strict 
individualism; 
optimal individual 
choice model; 
utility 
maximization; 
general 
equilibrium 
framework; 
 
strict individualism;  
optimal individual 
choice model; 
utility 
maximization; 
general equilibrium 
framework; 
 
strict individualism;  
optimal individual 
choice model; 
utility maximization; 
general equilibrium 
framework; 
 
holistic or 
collectivistic 
approach;  
METHOD reductive - 
deductive method: 
high formalism; 
 
reductive - 
deductive method; 
high formalism; 
econometric 
techniques 
comparative 
institutional analysis, 
but (actually) reductive 
– deductive method; 
formalism (but less 
than orthodoxy and 
mainstream); 
multidisciplinary 
method; 
econometric 
techniques; 
 
 
comparative – 
inductive method 
(case studies and 
pattern modeling); 
descriptive analysis 
of quantitative 
information; 
social change, 
power and cultural 
elements as part of 
the analysis; 
multidisciplinary 
method; 
anti-formalism; 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Between old and new institutionalism: institutional cognitive economics  
 
As an enlargement of mainstream theory, new institutional economics is in strong disagreement 
with the tenets of old-original institutionalism. However, it can be thought of as integration between 
the two. 
 
4.1 Origins and main features 
 
The Institutional cognitive approach to economics adopts an evolutionary concept of economic 
processes that derives from old institutionalism and from the works of F. Hayek (Rizzello and Turvani, 
2000; Ambrosino, 2005; 2012). 
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Economic processes are strongly conditioned by institutional norms that structure and regulate 
individual and social action. The concept of institution derives from Hayek’s theory (Hayek, 1952; 
1998a; 1998b; see also Fontana, 2012) on the link between mind and institutions. Institutional norm is 
conceived as the result of an enactive, evolutionary process that starts from the production of 
knowledge and ends with the production of a behavioral pattern which - if adopted by the social group 
- becomes a consolidated norm (at formal or informal level). Such process is mold by cultural 
dimension and social interaction.  Therefore, individuals and institutions are reciprocally connected. 
Institutions reflect perception mechanisms and knowledge of individuals and, at the same time, they 
work as social grids directing and constraining individual behavior.  
In Hayek’s theory, institutions solve the problem of understanding how knowledge is produced 
and distributed (Hayek, 1945) - and are related to subjectivism, according to which “explanation in the 
social sciences consists in tracing social phenomena back to the perceptions and intentions of the 
agents those phenomena comprise” (Langlois, 1985, p. 493). 
The link between mind and institutions had been already seen by old institutionalism and 
particularly stressed in Veblen’s works, as explained in section 3.2. However, while Veblen considers 
only the social level, Hayek makes a step forward by setting forth the cognitive roots of institutional 
genesis and evolution and, in so doing, he shifts the analysis from the social to the individual level 
(Ambrosino, 2012). 
Putting at the center of analysis the production of individual knowledge and its role on socio-
institutional mechanisms, institutional cognitive economics integrates a holistic approach with 
individual analysis16 and connects to the general framework of cognitive economics. 
 
As for the rationality of individual, in accordance with cognitive economics (Egidi and Rizzello 
2004), institutional cognitive economics adopts the Simonian notion of procedural rationality (Langlois, 
1986).  
 
While the main theoretical roots of institutional cognitive approach have been traced by the old 
institutionalism and by the Hayekian theories, a relevant contribution derives from part of the new 
institutional economics (Ambrosino, 2012). 
North explicitly recognizes the fundamental link between institutions and mind mechanisms, 
maintaining that mental models are the internal representations that mind builds to interpret the 
environment, while institutions are the corresponding external mechanisms that are created to structure 
it (North, 1990; 1994; 1996; 2003; 2005; North et al., 1993; 2004; 2006; Bronk, 2009). It is worth noting 
that North leaves behind his original maximizing and deductive approach that included institutions as 
                                                          
16  Rutherford (1996) 
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mere variables and that was in full agreement with mainstream economics (Rutherford, 2001, p. 188).  
He adopts an evolutionary model of economic system, which takes into account the central role of 
culture, ideas and ideologies on institutional genesis and evolution mechanisms (Groenewegen et al., 
1995; Hodgson, 2009).  
The main boundaries and exchange processes among institutional cognitive approach and the fields 
it draws on, are represented in the spirit of the oil-spot dynamics model - figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 – Institutional cognitive economics’ boundaries and placement 
 
____________________narrative____________________________________________________                
                                                                                                             
                                                                                         
                                                             
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                        
  
                                                                                                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________ narrative__________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Mainstream  
 
Old 
Institutional 
Economics 
New Institutional 
Economics 
 
Orthodoxy 
Cognitive Economics framework 
Institutional 
Cognitive  
Approach 
Heterodoxy 
 
Hayek 
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Table 2. synthetizes the main analytical focuses of Institutional Cognitive economics. In old 
institutionalism, the link between mind and institutions has been well defined by Veblen’s: institutions – 
named  “habits of thought” – in that mental regularities give rise to behavioral patterns socially adopted 
and to norms (Ambrosino, 2012).  
The context reflects the evolutionary concept of economic and social process: as in the original 
institutional analysis it is defined by strong interdependency and dynamism (Tabb, 1999; Hodgson, 
2000; Ambrosino, 2012). 
Taking into account the extremely recent development of institutional cognitive economics the 
table should not be considered a complete chart, particularly for what concerns methods.  
The paper agrees with the view that supports the comparative method which, based on field 
studies, leads to an “ethnographic record” – the summation of the “activities, the rules, and the 
applicable understanding or cultural underpinnings that comprise human behavior unfolding in an 
institutional context” – and to its interpretation (Stanfield, 1999). Towards this aim, Stanfield 
recommended to build on Hayek’s and North’s contributions. 
Institutional cognitive economics has to adopt the same suggested method. However, an 
integration among old (and Original), new institutionalism and Hayek’s theory of the mind is only the 
first step in the development of institutional cognitive economics. 
Hayek and Veblen are undoubtedly the forerunner of the cognitive analysis in institutional 
economics. Hayek, particularly, develops Veblen’s seminal insights (Ambrosino, 2012). Such theory 
however is not exhaustive and reveals some drawbacks that have to be overcome. Particularly, it needs 
to be integrated with new analytical tools and methods coming from cognitive sciences.  The same 
concerns also North’s thoughts. The explicit recognition of Hayek’s influence (North, 2005) does not 
results in its systematic inclusion in North’s theoretical building, nor is the claim that mental models 
play a relevant role in the genesis and evolution of institutions is adequately corroborated.  The task will 
probably constitute the future research agenda for institutional cognitive economics. 
 
     Table 2 – Institutional cognitive economics’ focuses of analysis 
 
                              
                                            AREAS 
 
     FOCUS OF  
    ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
             INSTITUTIONAL COGNITIVE 
                             ECONOMICS 
16 
 
 
 
 
4.2 The investigation of cognitive processes and the role of psychology 
 
The processes that regulate boundaries among the areas of economic theory are also affected by 
the exchanges between economics and psychology. Such mechanisms have produced in time two 
approaches: the behavioral and the cognitive approach to economics.  
Institutional cognitive economics locates itself within cognitive economics (as partly explained in 
the previous paragraph) and distances itself from the behavioral stream. 
Relevant differences exist between cognitive and behavioral economics in spite of their common 
ECONOMIC PROBLEM  
Dynamic and evolutionary process dependent on 
individual knowledge production process regulating 
decisional mechanisms and on social interaction; it is 
mediated by cultural dimension; 
 
INDIVIDUAL “institutionalized individual” whose preferences and 
choices strictly depend on the social and historical 
evolutionary process; reciprocal link with 
institutions at cognitive level; individuals are 
heterogeneous; 
 
CONTEXT dynamic, interdependent and uncertain context; 
historical time;  
 
INSTITUTIONS institutions as “habits of thought” and not mere 
devices: reciprocal causation bond with individuals;  
cultural and historical evolution; 
 
APPROACH the holistic approach is not abandoned but it is 
integrated by individual analysis investigating mind 
processes and knowledge production mechanisms 
intervening in institutional genesis and evolution 
mechanisms; 
METHOD comparative–inductive method; 
ethnographic record construction; 
multidisciplinary method;  
cognitive sciences analytical and experimental tools 
(in progress) 
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origin (Spada, 2010). Both originated from the criticisms to orthodox economic theory in the 50s of the 
20th century (Simon 1947; Katona 1951; Allais 1953) represent the main references in this sense. They 
stressed the cognitive limits of individual against the orthodox substantive rationality; the fundamental 
role of perceptive mechanisms and expectations; the importance of empirical and experimental 
method. However, while cognitive economics – developed in the 90s of the 20th century - fully adopted 
such criticisms and developed an autonomous stream of analysis, behavioral economics - developed in 
the 80s of the 20th century – absorbed only those elements compatible with mainstream theory and, 
particularly, with the maximization approach. Spada distinguishes among three different periods in 
behavioral economics: the old one (50s - 70s), characterized by a strong rejection of the maximization 
approach; the transaction one (70s - 80s) characterized by a closer approach to mainstream economics; 
the new one (in the 90s), where a complete compatibility with mainstream economics is affirmed. 
Spada finds relevant similarities in the role played by psychology in old institutional economics, old 
behavioral economics and cognitive economics. Early institutional economics (end of the 19th century - 
beginning of the 20th century) draws on the instinct theory of James, McDougall and Morgan and on the 
concept of habit expressed by Durkheim and Weber (Ambrosino, 2012). Habits were described as 
behavioral regularities intervening on nervous system development - on the one side - and on the 
genesis of institutional norms – on the other. Veblen used idiosyncratically the concepts of instinct and 
habit. He defined instincts as individual innate tendencies and habits as rules of action, through which 
individuals organize the external context and that are at the basis of institutional norms. In his view, 
instincts and habits are interdependent, but the latter are more resistant to change. 
  
Table 3 summarizes the principal theoretical roots of old institutionalism, old behavioral, cognitive 
and institutional cognitive economics. Their development defines a path, which gradually – from old 
institutionalism to institutional cognitive economics – is characterized by a progressive and more 
complex use of psychology and the adoption of appropriate tools and methods in economic analysis. 
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Table 3 – Psychology and economics - the placement of institutional cognitive economics 
 
 
 
                     PRINCIPAL  
THEORETICAL ROOTS  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
ANALYSIS 
First  
OLD 
INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS 
(between the end of the 
19th century and the 
beginning of the 20th 
century) 
 
 
 
 
 
Old 
BEHAVIORAL 
ECONOMICS 
(50s-70s of the 20th 
century) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COGNITIVE  
ECONOMICS 
(90s of the 20th century) 
and 
INSTITUTIONAL 
COGNITIVE 
APPROACH 
 
Instinct theory (W.James, 
W.McDougall, L.Morgan); 
Concept of habit (É.Durkheim and M. 
Weber work); 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Carnegie Mellon School;  
Universities of Michigan, Oxford, 
Stirling (limited rationality, 
uncertainty);  
H.Simon’s and G. Katona’s works; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oxford and Stirling Universities 
(uncertainty, knowledge); 
H.Simon, G..Katona, F.Hayek; 
C.Menger, T.Veblen, J.Commons; 
Cognitive sciences (Cognitive 
Psychology, Neurobiology, Mind 
Philosophy); 
 
 
idiosyncratic use of instinct and 
habit concepts (Veblen); 
psychology as a science including 
introspective analysis; 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
limited and procedural rationality; 
satisficing, not optimizing approach; 
incompatibility with mainstream 
theory; 
 
                    
 
 
 
 
limited and procedural rationality; 
satisficing, not optimizing approach; 
incompatibility with mainstream 
theory; 
empirical and experimental 
methods; use of simulations;  
analytical tools derived from 
cognitive sciences (social 
psychology, cognitive 
psychology, neuroscience, 
etc..) 
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5. Concluding remarks  
 
New institutional economics analyzes the institutional arrangements meaning, on the one side, the 
set of the social, political and juridical norms regulating production, trade and distribution, and, on the 
other side, the mechanisms governing relations among economic units, i.e. transactions (Rutherford, 
2001).  
Through the lens of oil-spot dynamics model, the paper describes new institutional economics as a 
research field that expands mainstream economics. In fact, while introducing institutions in economic 
analyses, Nie safeguards the fundamental theoretical pillars of the mainstream - particularly, the general 
equilibrium framework and the maximization approach. Institutions are introduced as mere variables: 
they are devices that reduce transaction costs and uncertainty.  
Incompatibilities with old-original institutional economics are evident. The most relevant element 
of inconsistency is paradoxically the same feature that, apparently, unites them: institutions. On the 
contrary, original institutional economics - particularly, Veblen - considers institutions as habits of 
thought, shedding light on the cognitive link between individuals and institutional norms.  
A part of the new institutional economics - and, particularly, some contributions of Douglass 
North – however, pick up the cognitive level of institutional economic analysis and continue the old 
institutionalism’s tradition.  
Institutional cognitive economics is currently developing at the borders among new and old 
institutional economics. In its perspective, economic process coincides with institutional and social 
evolution, where the concept of evolution does not imply improvement (Ambrosino, 2012).  
Institutional cognitive economics however is still in its infancy. In order strengthen, it has to go 
beyond the mere integration among old and new institutionalism and the Hayekian theory. It has to 
acquire the analytical tools that allow the development of a scientific field. Modern cognitive sciences - 
particularly, cognitive and social psychology and neuroscience - can play a central role to this aim. 
Significant examples of similar enterprises are provided by the recent opening to the cognitive approach 
of law and economics (Ambrosino and Biancone, 2013; Ambrosino, 2014) and of game theory in the analysis 
of institutions (Schelling, 1960; Hargreaves and Varfoufakis, 1995; Ambrosino, 2013).  
The former, starting from Mitchell’s (2002; 2003) defines a cognitive legal theory based on the 
individual and social perception of legal systems.17 As for the analysis of institutions in game theory, 
                                                          
17 Cognitive legal theory obviously overlaps with institutional cognitive economics. The definition of 
the precise border between the two falls beyond the scope of this paper, that only stresses the potential 
for cross-fertilization.  
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Schelling’s theoretical and empirical approach (1960) takes into account and encompasses some 
elements of cognition in social interaction through focal points that work as “clues” that coordinate 
agents’ decisions. The process whereby players, in coordination games, mutually perceive focal points 
seems to be the same originating institutional norms. 
In the wake of a growing interest in the cognitive and psychological features of economic processes, the 
paper defines the role and highlights the potentialities of institutional cognitive economics by revealing 
its precursors and its keens. It also corroborates the idea that a fruitful development strongly depends 
on the integration of old institutionalism, evolutionary economics and new institutionalism (Hodgson, 
2014; Hodgson and Stoelhorst, 2014). 
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